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Abstract
We study trade networks with a tree structure, where a seller with a single indivisible good
is connected to buyers, each with some value for the good, via a unique path of intermediaries.
Agents in the tree make multiplicative revenue share offers to their parent nodes, who choose
the best offer and offer part of it to their parent, and so on; the winning path is determined
by who finally makes the highest offer to the seller. In this paper, we investigate how these
revenue shares might be set via a natural bargaining process between agents on the tree, specif-
ically, egalitarian bargaining between endpoints of each edge in the tree. We investigate the
fixed point of this system of bargaining equations and prove various desirable for this solution
concept, including (i) existence, (ii) uniqueness, (iii) efficiency, (iv) membership in the core,
(v) strict monotonicity, (vi) polynomial-time computability to any given accuracy. Finally, we
present numerical evidence that asynchronous dynamics with randomly ordered updates always
converges to the fixed point, indicating that the fixed point shares might arise from decentralized
bargaining amongst agents on the trade network.
1 Introduction
Motivated by applications to ad exchanges such as the Yahoo!’s Right Media Exchange [Yah07], we
consider a theoretical model of trade networks which take the form of a rooted tree. In this model,
publishers selling impressions can be connected via a string of intermediary ad-networks [FMMP10]
to advertisers interested in buying these impressions at the leaf nodes. These intermediaries want
a cut of the surplus generated when a trade facilitated by them occurs. Typically, these cuts are
specified as multiplicative revenue shares or cuts on edges that link a pair of entities. In practice,
the value of these revenue shares would be set by business negotiations between the entities. A
∗Work done while the author was at Yahoo! Research.
†Work done while the author was at Yahoo! Research and the University of Illinois. Partially supported by NSF
grant CCF-1016684.
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natural theoretical question, is what constitutes a reasonable set of values for these revenue shares.
Of course, a complete solution to this problem would require analyzing a very complex setting with
advertisers and intermediaries optimizing over multiple heterogeneous impressions and publishers
in a network setting: in this paper, we take the first steps towards understanding this problem by
analyzing the sale of a single impression.
In our model, each buyer makes an offer to pay its parent intermediary in the tree a revenue
share in the form of some fraction of its value for the item, i.e., for being matched to the seller;
the parent intermediary chooses the highest offer from all the buyers it is connected to. Each such
intermediary then makes an offer to its parent, who selects the highest offer, and so on. Finally,
the seller selects the highest offer it receives from its children in the tree, which determines the
winning buyer. Given the tree structure and buyer values, the revenue shares completely specify
the winning path and all winners’ payoffs.
The two-player bargaining problem widely studied in cooperative game theory, where the seller
and a single buyer with value v must fairly divide the value v generated from their trade, is a
special case of this setting: in the simplest version, the bargaining solution is to split the value v
equally amongst the two agents. Now consider a tree network where the child and parent nodes on
each edge bargain about the revenue share using two-player bargaining. Here, the child might want
to offer a revenue share greater than 1/2 for two reasons: first, the parent node might have other
children to trade with that this node needs to beat out. Second, and more unique to our setting,
even if the child does beat out its siblings, the parent may not be able to make an adequately large
offer to beat out its siblings higher up in the tree, and so on— if this happens, neither the parent
nor the child belongs to the winning path, and the value actually realized by the child is zero. So
how much the child offers its parent, accounting for both of these effects, will depend on shares
elsewhere in the tree, i.e., the revenue share negotiated on an edge depends on shares elsewhere in
the tree. The key question we consider in this paper is whether there is a set of mutually consistent
shares on all edges, and if yes, what kinds of outcomes it generates.
While there has been plenty of work on network bargaining problems building on the seminal
work of Kleinberg and Tardos [KT08], the model considered in those papers is unsuitable to our
problem since the values that are being bargained on the edges are exogenous. In our setting, the
value being split on an edge is endogenous, depending on the splits elsewhere in the tree. In the
language of bargaining games, in the Kleinberg-Tardos model for network bargaining the feasible
set for the bargaining problem on each edge is independent of shares on other edges (although the
disagreement point is not), whereas in our setting the feasible set for an edge in the tree bargaining
problem changes with shares elsewhere in the tree.
Such endogenous values on edges arise naturally in bargaining networks arising from trading
settings, where there is competition for goods being sold. We consider the simplest possible version
of this new bargaining model, which is bargaining on a tree. There are certainly many possible
generalizations, but the goal of this paper is to analyze the simplest setting fully. Thus, while many
ad-hoc schemes can be proposed to compute these values, in this paper we investigate a natural
bargaining game motivated by the fact that entities in the trade network negotiate revenue shares,
and show that the outcome corresponding to the unique fixed point of this bargaining game on the
trade network has many desirable properties.
Overview of Conceptual Contributions and Technical Results. Our key conceptual con-
tribution in this paper is the formulation of a bargaining game on the trading tree and a new
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solution concept for the game based on fixed points of the bargaining game. In this bargaining
game, the nodes at the endpoints of each edge in the tree negotiate about how to split the value
arriving at the child node according to two-player egalitarian, or proportional, bargaining [Kal77],
given the splits elsewhere in the tree (Section 3). Each such two-player bargaining game gives
us a (non-linear) equation for the revenue share on that edge, and a fixed point of the game is a
simultaneous solution to this system of equations.
We first show a reduction from tree bargaining to path bargaining (Section 4). We prove that
for any tree and any set of buyer values, there is a reduced path such that every fixed point of the
system of bargaining equations on the path corresponds to a fixed point of the system of bargaining
equations on the tree, and vice versa. This reduction to path bargaining allows us to analyze a
smaller set of simultaneous equations, with one variable for each edge in the path, which we use to
prove the following set of results:
1. Existence and uniqueness: We show that a fixed point to the bargaining equations always
exists; further, the fixed point is unique.
2. Efficiency: The winner is always a buyer with highest value. (This is not true with Nash
bargaining.)
3. Core: The payoffs given by the fixed point of the bargaining equations belong to the core of
the natural cooperative game corresponding to our setting.
4. Strict Monotonicity: If the maximum value in the subtree rooted at a node in the winning
path increases, the node’s final payoff strictly increases as well.
5. Computability: The fixed point of the system of bargaining equations can be efficiently com-
puted to any accuracy in polynomial time by a centralized algorithm.
Finally, in Section 6.4, we present exhaustive numerical simulations indicating that asynchronous
dynamics, where at each step a random edge in the tree renegotiates the share xe given the current
shares in the remaining edges, converges rapidly to the fixed point– this suggests that decentralized
bargaining on edges should lead to the shares specified by this fixed point.
The outcome corresponding to the fixed point of the bargaining equations can be thought of as
a solution concept for the corresponding cooperative game. A natural question is the suitability of
other solution concepts such as the Shapley value or the nucleolus for our setting, or using Nash
bargaining instead to define the solution concept: all these candidates seem to have some deficiency
compared to our concept. We refer the interested reader to the appendixes C and D for a discussion.
Techniques. Our results are based on several analytical and combinatorial techniques. First, we
prove several structural properties that any fixed point solution, if one exists, must satisfy, which
allows us to reduce the general tree bargaining problem to a structurally simpler path bargaining
problem (see Section 4). Next, for the path bargaining problem, we use analytic techniques to
deduce certain monotonicity properties of any fixed point solution. These properties directly give
us uniqueness of the fixed point, assuming it exists. To show existence, we appeal to Brouwer’s
fixed point theorem by constructing a continuous mapping that is closely related to the bargaining
equations. Our proofs of the core and strict monotonicity properties of the fixed point are again
based on analytic techniques, and the use of an optimal substructure result for the fixed point
which follows from our uniqueness result. Finally, by refining our monotonicity arguments quanti-
tatively, we give an algorithm based on binary search to compute the fixed point to any accuracy,
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with running time that is polynomial in the number of nodes and the logarithms of the accuracy
parameter and the gap between the highest and second highest values.
Related work. The problem we study relates to many well-studied branches of the economics
and computer science literature. The question of how agents on the winning path should split the
generated value can be thought of as a fair division or revenue-sharing problem on which there is
an extensive literature, albeit in settings different from ours; for an overview, see [Mou04]. The
work of Blume et al. [BEKT07] is perhaps the most similar in spirit to ours from this literature,
though it looks at a different setting where traders set prices strategically and buyers and sellers
react to these offers in a general trade network, and investigates subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
There is much recent work on bargaining in social networks, starting with the work of Kleinberg
and Tardos [KT08]. This work extends the classic two-player bargaining problem to a network where
pairs of agents, instead of bargaining in isolation, can choose which neighbor to bargain with1. A
number of papers since [KT08] have addressed computational and structural aspects of the network
bargaining problem, as well as extensions to the model and dynamics; see [CK08, CKK09, ABC+09,
CDP10, ADJR10, Kan10]. While there are similarities between the network bargaining and our
model, there are also fundamental differences: there, an outcome is a matching on the network,
whereas we seek a path. More importantly, the values that are being bargained over on the edges
are exogenous in their model, while in ours the value being split on an edge itself depends on the
splits elsewhere in the tree: in the language of bargaining games, the feasible set for the bargaining
problem on each edge is independent of shares on other edges in the network bargaining problem
(although the disagreement point is not), whereas the feasible set for an edge in the tree bargaining
problem changes with shares elsewhere in the tree.
2 Model
There is a seller selling a single item, buyers, each of whom derives some value from the item, and a
number of intermediaries who assist in connecting buyers to the seller. The trade network between
these agents is given by a rooted tree T : the leaf nodes in T (denoted generically by l) are the buyers,
the root r is the seller, and the internal nodes (denoted generically by i) are the intermediaries.
We use vl to denote leaf l’s value for the item. The tree structure of the trade network means that
each buyer has a unique path to the seller. An instance (T,~v) of the tree bargaining problem is
specified by the tree topology T , and the values vl at the leaves of T .
We use e to denote edges and p to denote paths connecting the seller and a buyer in T . Given
a path p = {r, i1, . . . , ik, l}, we define the value of the path v(p) = vl. For any two nodes t1 and
t2 let pt1t2 denote the unique path from t1 to t2 in the tree T . A child node in the tree makes an
offer to its parent, who chooses the highest of these and offers part of it to its parent, and so on,
as described next.
The endpoints of each edge e = (t, s) in T split the value that arrives at the child node t,
specifying what portion of this value t retains and what portion it is willing to pass up to s. We use
xe, where xe ∈ [0, 1], to denote the multiplicative split or ‘revenue share’ on edge e: if the potential
value2 arriving at t is wt, t keeps wt(1−xe) and passes up wtxe to s. We use the multiplicative split
1For a nice survey of the literature on network exchange theory as well as two-player bargaining, see [KT08, CK08]
respectively.
2We say potential value because this value is realized only if these nodes belong to the winning path.
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xe rather than an additive split for convenience in correctly writing the bargaining equations. Note
that the value of xe can, of course, depend on wt, as well as the splits xe′ on other edges e
′ ∈ T .
Given an instance (T,~v), an outcome consists of a winning buyer l∗, which also specifies the
winning path p∗ = pl∗r, and a split of the value vl∗ amongst the nodes on the winning path (including
the leaf and the root).
The set of revenue shares xe completely specifies the outcome for an instance (T, v) as follows.
Every node in the tree, when presented with multiple children offering different payoffs, chooses to
transact with the child that gives her the highest payoff. Define the value reaching a non-leaf node
s ∈ T , ws, recursively as follows. Set wl = vl for all leaves l, and let Cs be the set of children of s
in T . Then, we have ws = maxt∈Cs xtswt.
Let t∗(s) = arg maxt∈Cs xtswt, with ties broken arbitrarily, denote the ‘winning child’ of the
parent node s. The path p∗ = (r, t∗(r), t∗(t∗(r)), . . . , l∗) from root r to leaf l∗ is the winning path,
and l∗ is the winning buyer. The value vl∗ , generated by matching l∗ to r is split among the nodes
on p∗ using the revenue shares on edges of p∗. For all other nodes in the tree, the payoff is zero.
This setting can also be modeled as a cooperative game; we do this in Section 6.
3 Bargaining on Trees
Given an instance (T,~v), the splits xe on the edges e ∈ T completely specify the outcome, namely
who the winning agents are, and what payoffs they receive. How might these splits xe be deter-
mined?
We consider a bargaining-based determination of the shares xe. We suppose that the agents
corresponding to the endpoint of each edge negotiate according to two-player bargaining about
how to split the value arriving at that edge. The trading tree structure affects the two-player
bargaining that takes place on each edge in two ways: first, the disagreement point for the parent
node is determined by the offers it negotiates with its other children, and second, the feasible set of
splits depends on the revenue share on the edge connecting the parent node to its parent, because
the parent node must pass up this fraction of the value that it receives from the split. Note that
the revenue shares on these edges all influence each other, since the split of the value on one edge
influences the bargaining power and therefore the split of the value on a different edge.
A natural choice for xe, then, would be a fixed point to the system of bargaining equations,
that is, a set of splits that are mutually consistent in the following sense: given the shares xe′ on
all remaining edges e′, the solution ye to the two-player bargaining problem on any edge e with
parameters specified by the remaining xe′ is precisely xe. It is not clear if such a fixed point exits,
and even if it does, whether the final winner in a fixed point is the buyer with highest value.
Bargaining equations. The egalitarian, or proportional, bargaining solution [Kal77] for the
two-player bargaining problem on the edge e = (t, s), given the shares xe′ on all other edges e
′ ∈ T ,
specifies that the parent and child node each receive an equal incremental benefit from participating
in the transaction.
Let Cs be the set of children of s in T . Let s
′ be the parent of s (if s = r, we consider a
fictitious parent r′ of r, with the revenue share on edge (r, r′) always set to 0). Define ws\t =
maxt′∈Cs\twt′xt′s. This is the maximum value that would reach s given a set of shares x if t did
not exist as a child of s. Then, the two-player egalitarian bargaining solution on (t, s) specifies
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splitting wt, the value reaching node t, according to xts where xts ∈ [0, 1] satisfies
(1− xts)wt = (1− xss′)
(
max(ws\t, wtxts)− ws\t
)
. (1)
The left-hand side is the incremental benefit to node t from transacting with s: it receives a
payoff of (1−xts)wt if it retains the edge with s, and nothing if it cuts off the edge. The right-hand
side is the incremental benefit to the parent node s: if it retains the edge (t, s), s can choose the
highest payoff from Cs of which it will keep a (1 − xss′) share (since it needs to share this payoff
with its parent); if it cuts off the edge (t, s), it only gets (1 − xss′) times the highest payoff from
the set Cs \ t.
The system of bargaining equations is given by writing (1) for all edges in the tree. A solution
to this system is a fixed point of the bargaining game on the tree.
Note: It may seem that Equation (1) implicitly assumes that the parent node s indeed lies on
the winning path because the payoff to s is (1− xss′)(maxt∈Cs xtswt) only if s lies on the winning
path, and is 0 otherwise. However, we can show (see Lemma 7) that when x is fixed point of these
equations as opposed to an arbitrary set of shares, and if s does not lie on the winning path, then
xss′ = 1, so that the right hand side is indeed s’s payoff (viz., 0). Thus, Equation (1) holds for a
fixed point solution irrespective of whether or not s lies in the winning path.
4 Reduction to path bargaining
The fixed point computation on the tree can be reduced to finding a fixed point of bargaining
equations on a single path– the path from the least common ancestor of the highest value leaves to
the root (if there is a unique leaf with highest value, this is the path from that leaf to the root).
For want of space we omit this reduction.
We summarize the reduction as follows. Let v? = maxl vl be the maximum value in T . Find
the least common ancestor s0 of the leaves {l1, . . . , lk} with vli = v∗. Remove the entire subtree
rooted at s0, and replace it with a fictitious buyer with value d0 = v
∗ at l∗ = s0.
Let the path from l∗ to the root be of length n; call this path P ∗. We relabel nodes from l∗
to the root 0, 1, . . . , n (so that l∗ is 0 and the root is n). For i ∈ [n], ei is the edge connecting
i − 1 to i. We can show (see Appendix B) that xe = 1 for all other edges e ∈ T . So to each node
i = 1, . . . , n, we can add a single edge with xe = 1, to a fictitious buyer— this fictitious buyer’s
value is the largest value excluding v∗ in the subtree rooted at i. Call this value di; this is node i’s
disagreement point, and we may also think of di as node i’s bid for the item being sold. We refer
to this reduced instance as a path because the only edges with unknown revenue shares xi lie on a
path. Denote this new path bargaining instance by (P ∗, ~d). Note that di is strictly less than d0 for
i = 1, . . . , n. The following theorem, proved in Appendix B, summarizes this reduction:
Theorem 1. Given an instance (T,~v) of the tree bargaining problem, construct the path bargaining
instance (P ∗, ~d) as described above. Then, ~x is a fixed point for T if and only if xe = 1 for e /∈ P ∗,
and the shares xe, e ∈ p∗ constitute a fixed point to the path bargaining problem (P ∗, ~d).
5 Existence and Uniqueness of Fixed Point
We now investigate fixed points of the path bargaining problem, having shown that every tree
bargaining instance can be reduced to a path bargaining instance. To maintain the flow for easier
reading, all proofs in this section are deferred to Appendix E.
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Recall that the value at node 0 is d0 and the remaining values at the leaves d1, d2, . . . , dn are all
strictly less than d0. The share on edge ei is xi. For notational convenience, we assume there is a
fictitious edge en+1 going up from the root to a fictitious node labeled n+ 1 with share xn+1 := 0.
For i = 0, 1, . . . , n, define wi = d0
∏i
j=1 xj , i.e. the value that reaches node i.
A fixed point solution ~x = 〈x1, x2, . . . xn〉 satisfies the bargaining equations (2) for all edges i,
with xi ∈ [0, 1]: that is, it simultaneously solves the following system of equations, one for each
edge ei:
(1− xi)wi−1 = (1− xi+1)(xiwi−1 − di). (2)
We note that in replacing the max{xiwi−1, di} term by xiwi−1 on the right-hand side of the
bargaining equation, we have used the fact (shown in the proof of Lemma 6) that we must have
wi−1xi ≥ di in any fixed point xi since di < d0.
We can rewrite each bargaining equation in two ways: the “upward equation” gives xi+1 in
terms of xi:
xi+1 = 1− (1− xi)wi−1
xiwi−1 − di = 1−
wi−1 − wi
wi − di . (3)
The “downward equation” gives xi in terms of xi+1:
xi =
wi−1 + (1− xi+1)di
(2− xi+1)wi−1 . (4)
Now we show that a fixed point to the path bargaining equations always exists, and is unique.
The existence proof is via Brouwer’s fixed point theorem. We show that the mapping f that
is (essentially) obtained by simultaneous updates to the shares on all edges using the downward
equations (4) is a continuous mapping from [0, 1]n to itself. The uniqueness proof requires more
effort. We write two equations for xn in terms of x1: one by using the upward equations (3) and
one by using the downward equations (4). These equations can be represented by two curves, and
any intersection point of the two curves leads to a fixed point. We next show that in the feasible
range for the curves, one is strictly increasing, and the other strictly decreasing; thus there is a
unique intersection point. We now formalize this.
First, we use the upward equations to write x2, x3, . . . , xn in terms of x1 and ~d. However,
not every value of x1 ∈ [0, 1] will give us to values of xi in [0, 1] and wi > di. We will say that
x1 is feasible if it does lead to xi ∈ [0, 1] and wi > di. The following lemma characterizes some
monotonicity properties of the xi’s and wi’s when written in terms of x1.
Lemma 1. If x′1 < 1 is feasible, then for all x1 ∈ [x′1, 1), and for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n:
1. xi ∈ [x′i, 1)
2. wi > di.
3. dxidx1 > 0 (so xi is strictly increasing as a function of x1).
4. dwidx1 > 0 (so wi is strictly increasing as a function of x1).
Here, xi, wi (resp. x
′
i, w
′
i) etc. are defined by x1 (resp. x
′
1) using the upward equations (3).
Since xi = 1 for all i is a feasible solution, in particular x1 = 1 is feasible, and Lemma 1
immediately implies the following structure of the feasible region:
Lemma 2. Let x◦1 = inf{x1 : x1 is feasible}. Then the feasible region for x1 is either the interval
[x◦1, 1] or (x◦1, 1], depending on whether x◦1 is feasible or not.
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If x1 is feasible, and x2, . . . , xn, are computed using the upward equations, then the balance
conditions for edges e1, e2, . . . , en−1 are automatically satisfied. The equation for en may not be
satisfied, however. A fixed point is obtained precisely when xn satisfies the balance condition for en.
Geometrically, equations (3) and (4) for xn define two curves, the upward curve, and the downward
curve respectively. A fixed point is obtained at any intersection point of the two curves for xn in
the feasible region of x1. The following lemma gives monotonicity properties of the two curves:
Lemma 3. In the feasible region for x1, the upward curve for xn is strictly increasing, and the
downward curve for xn is strictly decreasing.
We immediately get our uniqueness result:
Theorem 2 (Uniqueness). If a fixed point to the equations (2) exists, then it is unique.
Proof. This is immediate from Lemma 3: a strictly increasing and strictly decreasing curve can
intersect in at most 1 point.
Finally, using Brouwer’s fixed point theorem we can show that a fixed point always exists:
Theorem 3 (Existence). A fixed point to the bargaining equations (2) exists.
Briefly, we consider the following function f : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]n, which represents a simultaneous
update of the shares vector ~x on all edges using the downward equations:
fi(x) = min
{
wi−1 + (1− xi+1)di
(2− xi+1)wi−1 , 1
}
,
where wi−1 = d0
∏i−1
j=1 xj as usual, xn+1 := 0, and we make the convention that when wi−1 = 0, the
first expression in the minimum above is +∞, so that fi(x) = 1. The above function is continuous,
and its domain [0, 1]n is a convex, compact set. By Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem, f has a fixed
point. The main work in the proof of Theorem 3 then consists in showing that any fixed point of
f is a fixed point to the bargaining equations (2).
6 Properties of the Fixed Point
6.1 Core Property
The setting we study is naturally modeled as a cooperative game (T, V ), where the agents are the
nodes in the trading tree T , and the coalition values V are defined as follows. The value of the
coalition consisting of nodes on a path p = (l, i1, . . . , ik, r) is V (p) = vl. A coalition cannot generate
value unless it contains a path from a leaf to the root; if it does contain such paths, its value is the
maximum value amongst these paths: V (S) = maxp∈S V (p), and V (S) = 0 if S does not contain
any such path p. Note specifically that V (S) = 0 for all sets that do not contain the seller r, and
that V (T ) = V (p∗) = v∗.
The core [LBS08] of a cooperative game (N,V ) is defined as a set of nonnegative payoff vectors
(u1, . . . , uN ) with
∑
ui = V (N) such that every coalition’s total payoff is at least as much as the
value it generates:
∑
i∈N ui ≥ V (S) ∀S. The core consists of the set of payoff vectors that are
not blocked by any coalition which can increase its total payoff by splitting from the grand coalition
and playing amongst themselves — an outcome not in the core is unlikely to occur in practice since
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there is a coalition that can benefit by deviating. In general, the core of a game can be empty, but
our particular cooperative game does have a non-empty core, and in fact, our fixed point lies in the
core. We can show the following theorem (proved in Appendix F):
Theorem 4. The payoff vector u∗ belongs to the core of (T, V ).
6.2 Monotonicity
Monotonicity, which means that increasing the bargaining power of an agent increases his payoff, is
a desirable property for a solution concept to our game. We establish a strict monotonicity property
for the payoff to all nodes on the winning path in terms of their bargaining power. Since we are
only interested in nodes on the winning path, we can restrict ourselves to discussing reduced path
instance P ∗.3 (We note that strict monotonicity cannot hold for nodes outside the winning path
since the outcome itself must change for these nodes to receive a nonzero payoff; however, a weak
monotonicity condition trivially holds.) We can prove the following strict monotonicity property
(proved in Appendix G):
Theorem 5. Consider the path bargaining problem. If any di is increased (but is still kept less
than d0) while the remaining di′ are unchanged, the payoff of i strictly increases.
6.3 Computability
We know that there exists a unique fixed point, x?, of the bargaining equations. We now turn to
computability of the fixed point. Note that since the shares affect the bids multiplicatively, the
fixed point solution is scale-free: if we scale all bids by the same amount, the fixed point stays the
same. So to simplify calculations, we assume that the maximum bid, d0, is normalized to 1, and
all other bids di are less than 1. We can give a polynomial-time algorithm to compute an ε-fixed
point: i.e., a set of shares such that all bargaining equations are satisfied within an additive ε error.
For the original unscaled bids where the maximum bid may not be equal to 1, the additive error
gets scaled by the maximum bid as well.
We now state our theorem (proved in Appendix H) regarding computability of an approximate
fixed point. It is given in terms of a parameter γ = min{1−maxi>0{di}, 1n+2}, which is essentially
how close the second highest bid is to the maximum. Note that the dependence on the error
parameter ε and γ is only poly-logarithmic. In practice, the algorithm converges extremely fast.
Theorem 6. There is an algorithm that, for any given ε > 0, computes an ε-fixed point to the
bargaining equations (2) in poly(n, log(1/γε)) time.
The algorithm essentially works by running a binary search to find the intersection point of
the upward and downward curves for xn. The parameter γ is important in giving bounds on the
number of iterations needed in the binary search to obtain the desired accuracy, essentially by
obtaining quantitative versions of the arguments of Section 5.
3When there is more than one leaf with value v∗, P ∗ does not contain all nodes on the winning path, but the
strict monotonicity result extends easily to that case since an increase in bargaining power for a winning node not in
P ∗ means that there is now a leaf with value greater than v∗.
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6.4 Dynamics
We have already seen in the previous sections that the solution prescribed by the fixed point of
the bargaining equations has several desirable properties. A natural question is whether the agents
on the tree would, without help from a centralized authority, be able to converge to this fixed
point. We now present numerical evidence that this is indeed likely. Our experiments suggest
that a natural dynamics consisting of asynchronous updates— where in each step a random edge e
updates xe according to the two-player egalitarian bargaining equation (1), using the current values
of xe′ on other edges— indeed converges to the fixed point.
We run 10, 000 tries of the following experiment: generate random bids at the leaves of a depth-8
balanced binary tree with 256 leaves and 510 edges; this is a convenient size that permits 10, 000
tries to be run in a few hours. The bids are drawn from the lognormal distribution e(1+N) where N
is the normal distribution with zero mean and unit variance. We initialize all 510 edge multipliers
to the arbitrary value 0.99, and then repeatedly re-negotiate the edge multipliers one at a time in
a random order: the negotiation for each edge consists of solving equation (2) for that edge (while
freezing the values of all other multipliers). More specifically, binary search down to an tolerance
of 1.0× 10−15 is used to solve the equation. The edge updates are organized into “rounds” during
each of which every edge is individually updated in a random order specified by a different random
permutation for every round.
We continue iterating until the solution is close enough to the fixed point computed using the
reduction to the path and the algorithm in Section 6.3. The efficient fixed point finding algorithm
uses the reduction of Section 4 to convert the tree problem to a path problem. This path problem is
then solved using a heuristic program (not described here) that uses the algorithm of Section 6.3 as
a subroutine and computes the 8 multipliers to a nominal accuracy of 2.0× 10−16. The multipliers
for the original tree are obtained by copying those 8 values onto the winning path and then setting
the 502 multipliers lying on side branches to the value 1.0.
Every one of the 10,000 tries converged to the desired tolerance. The plot in Figure 1 shows
the average convergence rate summarizing those 10,000 tries. It is clear that the shares always
converge to within the desired accuracy at a reasonable rate. While we do not include the figures
here, we also observed similar convergence behavior on trees with different structures and sizes, as
well as for several different bid distributions.
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Figure 1: Asynchronous dynamics convergence: accuracy vs. average number of rounds to achieve
accuracy.
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7 Further Directions
In this paper, we defined a bargaining game on trees motivated by a fair division question in display
ad exchanges, and investigated the properties of its fixed point. There are a number of interesting
directions for further work. The most interesting open question is proving the convergence of
dynamics, since numerical simulations strongly suggest that even asynchronous dynamics converge
to the fixed point. Another interesting direction is that of a Bayesian model for values— suppose
instead of values vi at the leaves, we had distributions of values. The problem of solving the
bargaining equations to set the shares xe in this case is a very meaningful one, but also one that
appears to be technically extremely challenging. Finally, there are questions related to extending
the trade network model itself: for example, in this paper, we only consider a single seller and
a tree topology. The question of how to model and solve for multiple sellers, and how the fixed
point behaves if the underlying trade network is a directed acyclic graph instead of a tree, are also
interesting directions for further work.
Acknowledgments. We are very grateful to Nikhil Devanur and Mohammad Mahdian for in-
sightful discussions on network bargaining and cooperative games, and to Matt Jackson, Preston
McAfee, Herve Moulin, Michael Schwarz, and Mukund Sundararajan for helpful comments and
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A Example of bargaining equations
A
B C
D E F
vD vE vF
xAB xAC
xBD xBE xCF
Figure 2: A trading tree.
Equation for edge(D,B) :
(1− xDB)vD = (1− xBA)(max{xDBvD, xEBvE} − xEBvE)
Equation for edge(E,B) :
(1− xEB)vE = (1− xBA)(max{xDBvD, xEBvE} − xDBvD)
Equation for edge(F,C) :
(1− xFC)vF = (1− xCA)(xFCvF )
Equation for edge(B,A) :
(1− xBA)(max{xDBvD, xEBvE}) = max{xBA max{xDBvD, xEBvE}, xCAxFCvF } − xCAxFCvF
Equation for edge(C,A) :
(1− xCA)xFCvF = max{xBA max{xDBvD, xEBvE}, xCAxFCvF } − xBA max{xDBvD, xEBvE}
B Reduction to Path Instance
We will assume henceforth that T has been pruned to remove all buyers with value zero, i.e., vl > 0
for all leaves l in T . Recall also that when we write e = (t, s), t is the child and s the parent.
Our first lemma shows that the revenue shares in any fixed point must be nonzero, that is,
xe ∈ (0, 1] for any fixed point ~x.
Lemma 4. Let ~x be any fixed point to the bargaining equations on T . For any edge e ∈ T , xe > 0.
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Proof. Suppose not. Choose edge e = (t, s) with xts = 0 such that every edge in the subtree rooted
at the child node t has share xe′ > 0. Since xts = 0, the marginal benefit to the parent node s from
the edge (t, s) is zero, i.e., max(wtxts, ws\t)− ws\t = 0.
Since vl > 0 for all l ∈ T and xe′ > 0 for all e′ in the subtree rooted at t, we must have wt > 0.
But then (1 − xts)wt = wt > 0, a contradiction to ~x satisfying the bargaining equation on edge
e = (t, s).
Our second lemma allows us to show that if the share xe on an edge e is 1 in a fixed point (i.e.,
the child passes up all the value to the parent), the share on every edge in the subtree below e must
be 1 as well in that fixed point.
Lemma 5. Consider edges (t, s), (s, s′) such that s is the parent of t and s′ is the parent of s, and
let ~x be any fixed point. If xss′ = 1 then xts = 1 also.
Proof. By definition, the fixed point satisfies the bargaining equations on edge (t, s):
(1− xts)wt = (1− xss′)(max(ws\t, xtswt)− ws\t).
Since xss′ = 1, the right-hand side is zero. Also, wt > 0, since xe > 0 on every edge e in a fixed
point by Lemma 4 and vl > 0 for all leaves l. Therefore, to satisfy (1 − xts)wt = 0, we must have
xts = 1.
The following corollary follows immediately.
Corollary 7. Consider any child node t with parent s in T . If xts = 1 in a fixed point, then xe = 1
for every edge e in the subtree rooted at t in this fixed point.
Next we show that the path corresponding to a buyer with the highest value will also offer the
highest final value to the seller, and therefore win: that is, the outcome corresponding to any fixed
point is always efficient.
Lemma 6. Let v∗ = maxl∈T vl be the highest value on the leaves, and let l∗ be a highest value leaf
with corresponding path p∗ to the root. Let l be any leaf with value vl < v∗ and corresponding path
p to the root. Then, in any fixed point ~x,
v∗
∏
e∈p∗
xe
 > v(∏
e∈p
xe
)
.
Proof. Suppose not. Then, there exists a path p = {l, i, . . . , r} with vl < v∗ and
v∗
∏
e∈p∗
xe
 ≤ v(∏
e∈p
xe
)
.
Let s be the least common ancestor of l and l∗ in T . Let t be the child of s such that (t, s) ∈ p
and let t∗ be the child of s such that (t∗, s) ∈ p∗. Let p∗l∗s be the portion of path p∗ from l∗ to s,
and similarly pls be the portion of path p from l to s. Let s
′ be the parent of s, and consider the
bargaining equation for the edge (s, t∗),
(1− xst∗)wt∗ = (1− xss′)(max(ws\t∗ , xst∗wt∗)− ws\t∗).
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Since v∗
(∏
e∈p∗ xe
)
≤ vl
(∏
e∈p xe
)
, and the paths p∗ and p differ only ’below’ s (by choice of s),
it must be that v∗
(∏
e∈p∗
l∗s
xe
)
≤ vl
(∏
e∈pls xe
)
as well. Therefore, the value offered to s by t∗
is no larger than the value offered by t, or ws\t∗ ≥ xst∗wt∗ . Therefore, the right hand side of the
bargaining equation above is zero.
As before, wt∗ > 0 in any fixed point from Lemma 4 and because vl > 0 for all leaves l. Therefore,
it must be the case that xst∗ = 1. But then xe = 1 for all e ∈ p∗l∗s by Corollary 7, which says that
all edges ’below’ t∗ must have a share of 1 also. But then v∗
(∏
e∈p∗
l∗s
xe
)
= v∗ > v ≥ v
(∏
e∈pls xe
)
since v < v∗ and xe ≤ 1, a contradiction.
The following corollary follows immediately from the result above, since every parent node
chooses the highest offer from amongst its children.
Corollary 8. The outcome corresponding to any fixed point ~x is efficient, i.e., the winner is a leaf
with highest value.
Recall that our goal is to investigate fixed points ~x of the system of bargaining equations, one
bargaining equation for each edge e in T . Next, we identify the value of xe in any fixed point on
all but one (sub)path in the tree. Our first lemma tells us that the values of xe for all edges e /∈ p∗,
where p∗ is a path from a highest value buyer to the root, must be xe = 1 in any fixed point, if at
all one exists.
Lemma 7. Let e be any edge that is not on a path from a highest value leaf to the root. Then, in
any fixed point ~x, xe = 1.
Proof. Let p∗ denote the path from a highest value leaf to the root. Consider an edge e on a path
from a leaf l with value vl < v
∗ to the root, with xe < 1. Let s be the least common ancestor of l∗
and the child endpoint of e. Let t be the child of s that is on the path from s to the edge e (note
that s could be the parent endpoint of e, in which case t is the other (child) endpoint of e).
Let s′ be the parent of s, and consider the bargaining equation for edge ts,
(1− xts)wt = (1− xss′)(max(ws\t, xtswt)− ws\t).
Since vl < v
∗, we have from the proof of Lemma 6 and by choice of s that ws\t > xtswt.
Therefore, the right-hand side of the bargaining equation is 0 and so (1 − xts)wt = 0 as well; as
before, this can only happen with xts = 1. Since e belongs to the subtree rooted at s, by Corollary
7, xe = 1 as well.
In general, there could be more than one such path p∗ if there is more than one leaf with value
vl = v
∗; so far, we do not know how to deal with these multiple paths. Our next lemma shows us
how to deal with this. The proof is very similar to the previous lemmas, and is in Appendix C.
Lemma 8. Suppose there is more than one leaf with vl = v
∗. Let {l1, . . . , lk} be leaves with vli = v∗,
and let s be the least common ancestor of {l1, . . . , lk} in T . Then, in any fixed point, xe = 1 for all
edges in the subtree rooted at s.
In particular, this lemma tells us that if there are two buyers with maximum value in different
subtrees rooted at the seller, the seller extracts full value.
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Proof. Let (ti, s) be the child of s on path plis from leaf li to s, and let s
′ be the parent of s. First,
recall from the proof of Lemma 6 that at every internal node i, v∗
∏
e∈plj i xe > v
∏
e∈pli xe for all
leaves l with value v < v∗ in any fixed point. Therefore, the maximum value at every internal node
must come from one of the paths corresponding to {l1, . . . , lk}. So the bargaining equation for the
edges (ti, s) can be written as
(1− xsti)wt = (1− xss′)( max
j∈{1,...,k}
(xstjwtj )−max
j 6=i
(xstjwtj )).
Let i∗ = arg maxj(xstjwtj ). Then, for any i 6= i∗, the right-hand side of the bargaining equation
above is zero (note that this is true even if the arg max is not unique). As before, wti > 0 in the
right-hand side, so we must have xsti = 1 for all i 6= i∗. By Corollary 7, this means that xe = 1
for all edges in the subpath from s to li. Therefore wti = v
∗ and xstiwti = v∗ as well. But this is
the maximum possible value for xstjwtj since all the xe ≤ 1. Therefore, the right-hand side of the
bargaining equation is zero for i = i∗ as well, and xsti∗ = 1 also; again by Corollary 7, xe = 1 for
the remaining edges in this subpath as well. Since we already know that xe = 1 for edges on all
other paths in T , this proves our claim.
Together, these lemmas will be adequate to reduce the tree bargaining problem to path bar-
gaining problem.
We make a brief aside before summarizing the reduction to a path from a tree. Recall that
given a set of revenue shares x, we defined nodes’ payoffs in our model by computing the winner
recursively at every parent node until the root, and then setting the payoffs of nodes not on the
winning path to 0, and the payoffs of nodes on the winning path to be those given by x. The
following proposition states that the payoffs to nodes when the revenue shares x constitute a fixed
point of the bargaining equations can be written directly in terms of the x; that is, we do not need
to ‘manually’ set the payoffs to zero for nodes off the winning path.
Proposition 9. Suppose ~x is a fixed point of the bargaining equations. Then each node’s payoff
can be computed recursively as ut = (1− xts)wt.
The easy proof follows from Lemmas 7 and 8 which tell us that xe = 1 for all edges not on
a path from a highest value leaf to the root; therefore (1 − xts)wt = 0 corresponding to the zero
payoff received by these nodes in our model.
Using these lemmas, the reduction described in Section 4 follows. An example of this reduction
is shown in Figure 3.
A
B C
D E F
vE vF
G H
vG vH
xGD xHD
xDB xEB
xBA xCA
xFC
A
B
D E F
vE vF
G H
vG vH
xDB
xBA
1 1
1 1
1
Figure 3: Reduction from tree to path. The largest value is vG = vH .
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C Other Solution Concepts
Here we discuss other possible ways to choose a winner and distribute the payoff amongst nodes
in the tree. While we use a bargaining game to determine the outcome many other allocations
might seem natural as well. For instance, one possible outcome is to choose the winner as the leaf
with a highest value, and allocate this maximum amongst the nodes on p∗ by starting at the leaf,
and assigning to each node the incremental value it adds to the tree. in the special case with no
intermediaries and only buyers and the seller , this leads to the same outcome as a second price
auction. There are different variants of the scheme, one of which we will detail next — however,
as the example shows, such allocations have the undesirable property of possibly assigning zero
payoffs to nodes on the winning part, even though they are crucial to generating the value v∗.
Given an instance (T, v), compute an outcome as follows: the path to the highest buyer is
chosen as the winning path and only nodes on this path receive nonzero payoffs. For a node s on
the winning path, let r(s) be the remaining unallocated value after assigning value to all nodes in
the path from the leaf to s. Let α(s) be the largest value at a buyer if the subtree rooted at s is
removed from the tree. Then, the value given to s is r(s)− α(s). For an example, consider Figure
2 and let vD be the highest value at a buyer. The value allocation would be D : vD−max{vE , vF };
B : vD −max{vE , vF } − vF ; A : vF . Intuitively, this allocation assigns each player s the additional
value she brings to the network through her subtree (i.e., the subtree rooted at s) excluding those
nodes in the winning path. Notice that if vF > vE then B receives zero value or, similarly, if vF = 0
then the seller A receives zero value.
A possible alternative model is to impose a fixed cost plus revenue share price structure— each
parent node charges a fixed cost to a child node for the connection that it provides the child node,
and in addition keeps some share of the value that it passes up towards the seller. The question
of how to choose such a fixed cost, and how the shares should be chosen given the fixed costs, is
beyond the scope of this paper.
Next we discuss the two standard solution concepts in cooperative game theory, the Shapley
value and the nucleolus. Recall that we prove that the fixed point leads to a payoff vector in the
core of the cooperative game.
C.1 Shapley value not in core
The Shapley value for our cooperative game (T, V ) can award nonzero payoffs to nodes not in the
winning path, which is clearly an undesirable property. The simplest example for this is when
the tree has no intermediaries, and simply the seller and two buyers, with values, say, 12 and 6
respectively. In this case, the Shapley value of the game awards a payoff of 7 to the seller, and 4
and 1 to the two buyers respectively. It is easy to see that the example extends to larger trees with
intermediaries, again giving nonzero payoffs to nodes not on p∗.
By Proposition 11, such a payoff vector cannot belong to the core; therefore, the Shapley value
need not belong to the core in our cooperative game.
C.2 Nucleolus is not strictly monotone
The nucleolus is a standard solution concept in cooperative game theory [LBS08], and always
belongs to the core when the core is nonempty. However, as we will see next, the nucleolus does not
possess the strict monotonicity property possessed by the fixed point of the bargaining equations.
16
This is analogous to the lack of strict monotonicity of the nucleolus in the network bargaining game
as shown in [ADJR10] (we note though that the alternative solution concept we consider can be
computed in polynomial time in contrast to the other solution concepts discussed in [ADJR10]).
The example below shows that the nucleolus need not be strictly monotone with di.
Consider a path with three nodes with d0 = 5, d1 = 1 and d2 = 3. It can be verified that
the nucleolus for the cooperative game (T, V ) corresponding to the tree awards payoffs x0 = 2/3,
x1 = 2/3 and x2 = 11/3 (recall that node 0 is the buyer and node 2 is the seller).
Now suppose d1 increases to d1 = 2, while all other values remain the same. Again, it can
be verified that the nucleolus remains x0 = 2/3, x1 = 2/3 and x2 = 11/3. That is, the payoff
awarded to node 1 by the nucleolus does not increase even though the bargaining power, quantified
by d1 increased. This is in contrast to the payoffs resulting from the bargaining solution, which are
strictly monotone in the di.
D Nash bargaining
Suppose the players at the endpoints of each edge were to decide on a split using Nash bargaining
instead of egalitarian bargaining, taking the shares on other edges as given, as before. As we show
below, using Nash bargaining instead of egalitarian bargaining can actually lead to an inefficient
solution— the winner need not be the buyer with the highest value. The reason this happens is that
these bargaining equations do not allow the child node to factor in the outcomes at nodes higher
up in the tree: the value wt being bargained about is realized only if the parent node receives an
adequately high portion of wt to beat out other competitors at its parent node. In our formulation
of the bargaining equations where the players engage in egalitarian bargaining, the child node
equates its payoff with the net payoff of the parent, accounting for the fact that the parent must
pass up some of the value from bargaining with this child. Thus, if the net payoff to the parent
is zero, corresponding to losing, the child receives zero payoff too— roughly speaking, a child with
adequately high value will therefore pass up as much value as necessary (or possible) to its parent
to ensure a nonzero payoff which the egalitarian bargaining equations. When we write the two
player Nash bargaining equation however, the child only bargains ‘myopically’ without accounting
for the fact that it needs to actually be on the winning path to receive any payoff. That is, it
bargains for a fair share assuming its parent will win, rather than for a fair share that still gives
the parent node enough value to win higher up in the tree.
We note that essentially the same problem occurs when an additive, rather than multiplicative,
form is used for the splits, since the amount that the parent must pass up is subtracted from both
terms on the RHS, namely the parent’s benefit with or without this child— when this term does
not influence the solution to the bargaining, inefficiencies can arise.
To be precise, consider the Nash bargaining solution for an edge e = (t, s) is given by the
following optimization,
max (u1 − d1)(u2 − d2)
(u1, u2) ∈ S.
where u1 = (1 − xts)wt is the value obtained by t, d1 = 0 is t’s disagreement point, u2 = (1 −
xss′)(max(xtswt, ws\t) is the value obtained by s, and d2 = (1− xss′)ws\t is s’s disagreement point,
and the feasible set S is parameterized by constraining the variables xts and xss′ to lie in [0, 1].
Assume that wt > ws\t without loss of generality.
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Note that the amount that the parent needs to pass up, (1− xss′), factors out of the objective
and therefore the solution to the maximization, and does not affect the final split at all. Solving
this maximization problem we see that the solution has xts =
1
2 +
ws\t
2wt
. Thus, the child node t
keeps (wt − ws\t)/2, and passes up the remainder, namely (wt + ws\t)/2 to the parent node s.
Since the share on the edge above does not figure in the bargaining equation for this edge, the
only set of interdependent equations are the ones corresponding to different children of the same
parent. It is easy to check that by the same reasoning as before, the child with the highest wt will
‘win’ at the parent in any fixed point, and the shares on edges with lower wt will be 1. The value
that the parent receives will be (wt + wt′)/2, where wt and wt′ are the highest and second-highest
values at the child nodes respectively. This can lead to an inefficient outcome: for example, consider
the trading tree in Figure 2 with leaf node F removed (so that C becomes a leaf node). The values
at the leaves are vD = 1, vE = 0.1 and vC = 0.6. By the reasoning above, the value reaching B in
a fixed point solution is (1 + 0.1)/2 = 0.55. Thus, B cannot beat C even if B passes their entire
value 0.55 to the seller A, and hence the winner is C with value 0.6, rather than D, with value 1.
This is thus an inefficient solution.
E Proof of Lemmas from Section 5
We restate and prove Lemma 1.
Lemma 9. If x′1 < 1 is feasible, then for all x1 ∈ [x′1, 1), and for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n:
1. xi ∈ [x′i, 1)
2. wi > di.
3. dxidx1 > 0 (so xi is strictly increasing as a function of x1).
4. dwidx1 > 0 (so wi is strictly increasing as a function of x1).
Here, xi, wi (resp. x
′
i, w
′
i) etc. are defined by x1 (resp. x
′
1) using the upward equations (3).
Proof of Lemma 1. We prove this by induction on i. For i = 1, parts 1 and 3 are trivially true part
4 follows from w1 = d0x1. Finally, for part 2, we have w1 = d0x1 ≥ d0x′1 = w′1 > d1, since x′1 is
feasible.
Assume that the statement is true for some i ≥ 1, now we show it for i + 1. First, by the
induction hypothesis, we have xi < 1, and wi > di, and so xi+1 = 1− (1−xi)wi−1wi−di < 1. This proves
half of part 1. We now prove parts 3 and 4. We have
dxi+1
dx1
=
∂xi+1
∂xi
· dxi
dx1
+
∂xi+1
∂wi−1
· dwi−1
dx1
=
wi−1(wi−1 − di)
(xiwi−1 − di)2 ·
dxi
dx1
+
(1− xi)di
(xiwi−1 − di)2 ·
dwi−1
dx1
> 0,
since, by the induction hypothesis, we have xi < 1, wi−1 ≥ wi > di, dxidx1 > 0 and
dwi−1
dx1
> 0.
Similarly, we have
dwi+1
dx1
=
∂wi+1
∂xi+1
· dxi+1
dx1
+
∂wi+1
∂wi
· dwi
dx1
= wi · dxi+1
dx1
+ xi · dwi
dx1
> 0,
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since, by the induction hypothesis, we have wi > di > 0, xi ≥ x′i ≥ 0, dwidx1 > 0, and we just
proved that dxi+1dx1 > 0.
Now the other half of part 1, that xi+1 ≥ x′i+1 is immediate: this is because xi+1 is a strictly
increasing function of x1. Similarly, part 2, that wi+1 > di+1 is also immediate: this is because wi+1
is a strictly increasing function of x1, and so wi+1 ≥ w′i+1 > di+1 since x′1 is a feasible point.
We restate and prove Lemma 3.
Lemma 10. In the feasible region for x1, the upward curve for xn is strictly increasing, and the
downward curve for xn is strictly decreasing.
Proof. Lemma 1 establishes the fact that the upward curve for xn is strictly increasing.
Let x′n =
wn−1+dn
2wn−1 =
1
2 +
dn
2wn−1 be the downward curve. Since wn−1 is a strictly increasing
function of x1, we get that x
′
n is a strictly decreasing function of x1.
Finally, we restate and prove Theorem 3.
Theorem 10 (Existence). A fixed point to the bargaining equations (2) exists.
Proof. Consider the following function f : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]n, which represents a simultaneous update
of the shares vector ~x on all edges using the downward equations. Define f as
fi(x) = min
{
wi−1 + (1− xi+1)di
(2− xi+1)wi−1 , 1
}
,
where wi−1 = d0
∏i−1
j=1 xj as usual, and xn+1 := 0. We make the convention that when wi−1 = 0,
the first expression in the minimum above is +∞, so that fi(x) = 1. This choice is consistent with
the limit as wi−1 → 0+, even in the case when xi+1 = 1. Thus, the first expression is a continuous
function on the entire domain [0, 1]n. So f , being the minimum of two continuous functions, is
also continuous. Since [0, 1]n is a convex, compact set, by Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem, f has
a fixed point.
We show now that any fixed point of f is a fixed point to the bargaining equations (2). Suppose
x is a fixed point, i.e. f(x) = x. We first show that for all i, we have xi < 1. Suppose some xi = 1.
Then xi−1 = fi−1(x) = min
{
wi−1
wi−1 , 1
}
= 1. Continuing inductively, we get that xj = 1 for all j ≤ i.
This means that wi−1 = d0
∏i−1
j=1 xj = d0. Then
1 = xi = fi(x) = min
{
d0 + (1− xi+1)di
(2− xi+1)d0 , 1
}
=
d0 + (1− xi+1)di
(2− xi+1)d0
since di < d0. This implies that xi+1 = 1. Continuing inductively, we get that xj = 1 for all j > i,
and hence, all xj = 1, which implies that all wj = 1. But then, we get a contradiction for xn,
because using the convention that xn+1 = 0 we get
1 = xn = fn(x) = min
{
d0 + dn
2d0
, 1
}
≤ d0 + dn
2d0
< 1,
a contradiction. Hence no xi can equal 1. So the fixed point satisfies xi =
wi−1+(1−xi+1)di
(2−xi+1)wi−1 for all i,
i.e. all the downward equations (4), and hence we have a fixed point of the bargaining equations
(2).
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F Proof of Core Property
The following easy result follows immediately for our game from the definition of the core:
Proposition 11. If u is a payoff vector with ut > 0 for some t /∈ p∗, u does not belong to the core.
Proof. The value generated by the coalition p∗ is v∗, so any payoff vector u in the core must
satisfy
∑
t∈p∗ ut = v
∗. But
∑
s∈T us = V (T ) = v
∗. So if ut > 0 for some t /∈ p∗, we must have∑
t∈p∗ ut < v
∗ since all payoffs are nonnegative. So u cannot belong to the core.
This result immediately tells us that the Shapley value for this cooperative game does not
belong to the core: the Shapley value can assign nonzero payoffs to nodes not on the winning path
(Appendix A), and therefore need not belong to the core in our game.
Let u∗ denote the payoff vector resulting from the fixed point ~x to the system of bargaining
equations. Recall that u∗t = 0 for all nodes not on the path from s0, the least common ancestor of
the highest value leaves, to the root, and ut = (1 − xts)wt where the wt are defined recursively as
in Section 2.
Next we show the easy result that this payoff vector u∗, defined by the fixed point ~x of our
bargaining problem, indeed belongs to the core. Note that here we need to consider the original
tree-bargaining instance, and cannot simply argue about the reduced path bargaining instance,
since the cooperative game is defined on the tree T and the reduced path instance does not contain
all the agents present in T .
We now restate and prove Theorem 4.
Theorem 12. The payoff vector u∗ belongs to the core of (T, V ).
Proof. By definition of the core, we only need to argue that
∑
i∈S ui ≥ v(S) for all subsets of
agents S. First, if S does not contain a path p from a leaf to the root, V (S) = 0. So trivially∑
i∈S ui ≥ v(S) for such S, since ui ≥ 0. Now if the set S does contain such paths, it has value
V (S) = maxp∈S V (p). Let p be a path in S with value V (S).
First suppose that V (S) < v∗. Let s be the least common ancestor of the leaves corresponding
to p∗ and p. It is enough to show that the payoff to the nodes in the subpath of p∗ from s to r
(i.e., the nodes in the intersection between p and p∗) is at least V (S).
Note that the sum of the payoffs to all nodes in the subpath from s to the root is exactly the
value ws that arrives at s, i.e.,
∑
t∈psr ut = ws, since this subpath belongs to p
∗.
Now, we must have V (S) ≤ ds, where the di’s are as defined in the reduction from the tree to
the path. We have already shown that a fixed point satisfies wi ≥ di for all nodes i on the winning
path p∗ in the proof of Lemma 6. Therefore,∑
i∈S
ui ≥
∑
i∈psr
ui =
∑
i∈p∗sr
ui = ws ≥ ds ≥ v(S),
so that the core property is satisfied for the set S.
If V (S) = v∗, then S must contain a path from a leaf l with vl = v∗. Let s0 be the least
common ancestor of all such leaves in T ; from Lemma 8, we know that xe = 1 for all edges
in the subtree rooted at s0, and therefore ws0 = v
∗. As in the previous case, again, we have∑
i∈S ui ≥ ws = v∗ = V (S), so that the core property is satisfied for such sets S as well.
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G Proof of Strict Monotonicity
We restate and prove Theorem 5:
Theorem 13. If any di is increased (but is still kept less than d0) while the remaining di′ are
unchanged, the payoff of i strictly increases.
Proof. We prove this theorem in two parts. In the first part (see Lemma 11), we show that
increasing di increases all xj for j ≤ i. This implies that the revenue reaching i increases. In
the second part (see Lemma 12), we show that increasing di decreases xi+1, which implies that
the fraction of revenue retained at i, viz. (1 − xi+1) goes up. We thus obtain our monotonicity
condition.
We now state and prove Lemmas 11 and 12. We fix some notation first. Let the new value of
di be d
′
i > di (but less than 1). Let x
?
j , x
?
j
′ be the fixed point shares on edge ej for the two sets
of values respectively, and w?j , w
?
j
′ the fixed point revenues reaching node j. Let x◦1 and x◦1
′ be
the right end points for the feasible interval for x1 for the two sets of values. Let xn = U(x1) and
xn = D(x1) denote the upward and downward curves for xn computed as a function of x1, and let
x′n = U ′(x′1) and x′n = D′(x′1) be the corresponding curves for the second set of values.
Lemma 11. x?j
′ > x?j for all j ≤ i.
Proof. We now show that x?1 < x
?
1
′, which implies the lemma, since all values dj for j < i are
unchanged, and by Lemma 1, increasing x1 increases all shares above it up to xi.
Let x1 be a value that is feasible for both sets of values. Let xj and x
′
j denote the shares on ej
computed by the upward equations from x1 with the value at node i being di and d
′
i respectively.
Let wj and w
′
j denote the corresponding revenues reaching node j. Since all values dj for j < i are
unchanged, we have x′j = xj (and consequently, w
′
j = wj) for all j ≤ i.
Now, since d′i > di, the upward equation (3) shows that x
′
i+1 < xi+1. Since w
′
i = wi, Lemma 1
implies that x′j < xj for all j > i, and consequently, all w
′
j < wj for j > i as well. In particular, the
upward curve xn = U(x1) shifts down, and the downward curve, xn = D(x1) =
1
2 +
dn
2wn−1 , shifts
up since wn−1 increases.
Now, we have the following cases:
1. x?1 < x
◦
1
′. In this case, we are done since x?1
′ ≥ x◦1′ > x?1.
2. x?1 > x
◦
1
′. Then x?1 is feasible for both sets of values, and hence, by the above analysis, we
have U ′(x?1) < U(x?1) = x?n (because the upward curve shifts up), and D′(x?1) < D(x?1) = x?n
(because the downward curve shifts down). Hence, the intersection point of the U ′ and D′
curves must lie to the right of the intersection point of the U and D curves, which implies
that x?1
′ > x?1.
3. x?1 = x
◦
1
′. We can fold this case into one of the above two cases, depending on whether x◦1
′ is
feasible for the second set of values (then fold into case 2) or not (then fold into case 1).
Lemma 12. x?i+1
′ < x?i+1.
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Proof. We make use of the optimal sub-structure property of the fixed point solution: i.e. suppose
we fix the shares xj = x
?
j for j ≤ i, and recompute the fixed point shares for the remaining
tree. Then, the uniqueness property implies that we recover the original fixed point shares. More
precisely, consider a bargaining problem on a smaller tree which is obtained by pruning the original
tree at node i, and setting the value at node i to be w?i . The values di+1, di+2, . . . , dn stay the
same. Then, the uniqueness of the fixed point implies that the fixed point shares on edges ej , for
j > i, are precisely x?j , because setting the shares to x
?
j yields a fixed point solution to the new
bargaining problem.
Note that by Lemma 11, we have w?i
′ > w?i . We exploit the optimal sub-structure property as
follows. If we prune the subtree rooted at i, then a fixed point to the bargaining problem where the
maximum bid, at node i, is w?i has the same shares on the edges above i as in the original instance.
If we increase this maximum bid to w?i
′, then the new fixed point has the same shares as the fixed
point on the edges above i as in instance where di is increased to d
′
i. We now want to show that
x′i+1 < xi+1.
Mapping this reduction back to our standard notation for the path bargaining problem, we now
need to prove the following: in a path bargaining problem, suppose the maximum bid value d0 is
increased to some value greater than its original value. Then, in the new fixed point solution, x1
decreases. We now prove such a claim.
First, we prove that if x1 ∈ [0, 1] is feasible for the original set of values, then it is feasible when
the value d0 is increased to d
′
0, for any d
′
0 > d0. Let the new share values computed from x1 be x
′
i,
and the corresponding revenues w′i. We prove by induction on i that these values are feasible, and
furthermore, for all i, we have x′i ≥ xi and w′i > wi.
For i = 1, we have x′1 = x1 ∈ [0, 1], and w′1 = x′1w′0 = x1d′0 > x1d0 = w1. Finally, w′1 ≥ w1 > d1,
since x1 is feasible for the original set of values. Thus, the base case is established. Assume that
the inductive hypothesis is true for some i ≥ 1. Now we prove it for i+ 1.
We imagine the change from xi+1 to x
′
i+1 as happening in two steps. First, we increase wi−1
to w′i−1, keeping the share on ei fixed to xi. This gives an intermediate share on ei+1 of value
x′′i+1 = 1−
w′i−1(1−xi)
w′i−1xi−di . Then, we increase the share on ei from xi to x
′
i, keeping the revenue at node
i fixed to w′i−1. We show that in each step, the share on ei+1 increases and as is bounded in [0, 1],
i.e. xi+1 ≤ x′′i+1 ≤ x′i+1, and x′′i+1 ∈ [0, 1] and x′i+1 ∈ [0, 1].
In the first step, we have
x′′i+1 − x′i+1 =
[
1− w
′
i−1(1− xi)
w′i−1xi − di
]
−
[
1− wi−1(1− xi)
wi−1xi − di
]
=
(1− xi)di(w′i−1 − wi−1)
(w′i−1xi − di)(wi−1xi − di)
≥ 0.
Furthermore, since
w′i−1(1−xi)
w′i−1xi−di ≥ 0 (because w
′
i−1xi ≥ wi−1xi = wi > di by feasibility of x1), we
have x′′i+1 = 1−
w′i−1(1−xi)
w′i−1xi−di ≤ 1. Thus, x
′′
i+1 ∈ [0, 1].
Now, we prove the second step. We have
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x′i+1 − x′′i+1 =
[
1− w
′
i−1(1− x′i)
w′i−1x
′
i − di
]
−
[
1− w
′
i−1(1− xi)
w′i−1xi − di
]
=
w′i−1(w
′
i−1 − di)(x′i − xi)
(w′i−1x
′
i − di)(w′i−1xi − di)
≥ 0,
since w′i−1 ≥ wi−1 > di by feasibility of x1. Furthermore, since
w′i−1(1−x′i)
w′i−1x
′
i−di ≥ 0, we have
x′i+1 = 1−
w′i−1(1−x′i)
w′i−1x
′
i−di ≤ 1. Thus, x
′
i+1 ∈ [0, 1], as required.
As for w′i+1: we have w
′
i+1 = x
′
i+1w
′
i > xi+1wi = wi+1 where the strict inequality follows by the
inductive hypothesis. Furthermore, we have w′i+1 > wi+1 > di+1 by feasibility of x1. Thus, x
′
i+1 is
a feasible share value, and the induction is complete.
Now, we argue as in Lemma 11. When the max value d0 increases to d
′
0 > d0, we conclude from
the analysis above that the upward curve for the share on en, viz. x
′
n = U
′(x1) shifts upwards from
the original upward curve xn = U(x1). Also, the downward curve x
′
n = D
′(x1) = 12 +
dn
2w′n−1
shifts
strictly downwards from the original downward curve xn = D(x1) since w
′
n > wn. Now consider x
?
1.
We have U ′(x?1) ≥ U(x?1) = x?n, and D′(x?1) < D(x?1) = x?n. So U ′(x?1) > D′(x?1), and since U ′ and
D′ are increasing and decreasing respectively, their intersection point must satisfy x?1
′ < x?1.
H Computability of Fixed Point
Before going into algorithms, we need to first get a quantitative version of the arguments of Section
5 in order to understand what tolerance to use in our algorithms.
Lemma 13. For any i, we have x?i ≥ 12−xi+1 . In particular, x?i ≥ n−i+1n−i+2 , and w?i ≥ n−i+1n+1 .
Proof. This follows immediately from the downward equations:
xi =
wi−1 + (1− xi+1)di
(2− xi+1)wi−1 ≥
1
2− xi+1 .
The other parts follow by induction, starting with x?n+1 = 0.
Recall that γ = min{1−maxi>0{di}, 1n+2}.
Lemma 14. For all i we have x?i ≤ 1− γ4n and w?i ≥ di + γ4n+1.
Proof. For notational convenience, we drop the ? superscript. Suppose xi > 1 − γ4n for some i.
Then we get a contradiction as follows. First, we have
xi−1 =
wi−1 + (1− xi)di−1
(2− xi)wi−1 >
1
2− xi >
1
1 + γ4n
> 1− γ4n.
Inductively, we get that for all j ≤ i, xj > 1− γ4n.
Hence, wi−1 =
∏i−1
j=1 xj > 1− nγ4n. Then,
1− xi+1 = (1− xi)wi−1
xiwi−1 − di <
γ4n
(1− nγ4n)− (1− γ) ≤ γ
4n−2
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since γ ≤ 1n+2 . Hence, we get that xi+1 > 1 − γ4n−2. Continuing inductively, we get that xn−1 >
1 − γ(4n−2(n−1−i)) > 1 − γ2n. Then, we have wn−1 > 1 − nγ2n. But then using the downward
equation for xn, we get
1− γ2n < xn = 1
2
+
dn
2wn−1
<
1
2
+
1− γ
2(1− nγ2n)
< 1− 1
2
γ +
1
2
nγ2n =⇒ 1
n+ 2
< γ2n−1 ≤ γ,
which is a contradiction.
So we have established that all xi ≤ 1− γ4n. Now suppose for some i, we have wi < di + γ4n+1.
From Lemma 13, we have wi−1 ≥ 1n+1 > γ. So, we get from the upward equation for xi+1:
1 ≥ 1− xi+1 = (1− xi)wi−1
xiwi−1 − di >
γ4n · γ
γ4n+1
= 1,
a contradiction.
Now we can give an algorithm to approximate x?1 very accurately:
Lemma 15. Given any ε > 0, there is an algorithm that runs in poly(n, log(1/ε)) time which
computes a value x1 such that |x1 − x?1| < ε.
Proof. The algorithm basically runs binary search using the upward and downward curves for xn
to find an approximation to x?1. Care needs to be taken to make sure we are in the feasible region
[x◦1, 1] for x1. This can be incorporated in the binary search for x?1 by moving to the right half of
the current interval whenever the current value of x1 is infeasible (detected by a violation of the
conditions xi ∈ [0, 1] and wi > di.
Once we are in the feasible region, we know that the upward and downward curves for xn
intersect, and hence binary search can proceed by comparing the values of the two curves; moving
left if the upward curve is higher than the downward curve, and right otherwise. The pseudocode
is given in Algorithm 1. The running time follows from the properties of binary search.
We show now that an ε-fixed point can be computed efficiently as well. This proves Theorem 6,
which we restate here for convenience:
Theorem 14. Given any ε > 0, there is an algorithm that runs in poly(n, log(1/γε)) time which
computes an ε-fixed point to the bargaining equations (2).
Proof. The idea is to compute x?1 accurately enough so that for all i, we have |xi − x?i | < ε, and
|wi−w?i | < ε. Since all these quantities are in [0, 1], such an approximation implies that the balance
condition is satisfied up to an additive error of 10ε (the constant 10 here is a crude estimate).
Suppose we estimate x?1 to accuracy ε1. Then we compute bounds on the accuracy εi to which
x?i , is computed using the upward equations. To do this, we also need bounds δi on the accuracy
to which w?i−1 is computed. From the upward equations, using the fact that the denominator
w?i − di > γ4n+1, we get the following recurrence relation:
εi+1 ≤ c(εi + δi)
γ8n+2
≤ (εi + δi)
γ10n
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Algorithm 1 FixedPoint(d, ε)
1: Set ` = 0, h = 1.
2: while |h− `| > ε do
3: x1 =
`+h
2 .
4: Compute x2, . . . , xn using the upward equations (3). Also compute w1, w2, . . . , wn.
5: if any xi /∈ [0, 1] or any wi ≤ di then
6: ` = x1
7: else
8: Compute x′n =
1
2 +
dn
2wn
.
9: if xn > x
′
n then
10: Set h = x1
11: else
12: Set ` = x1
13: end if
14: end if
15: end while
16: Set x1 = h, and compute other xi using this value of x1. Return this solution.
for some constant c obtained by looking at the number of arithmetic operations performed. The
last inequality follows by choosing γ < 1/c.
As for δi+1, we get the following recurrence relation:
δi+1 ≤ c(εi + δi) ≤ (εi + δi)
γ10n
,
where for convenience of notation we use the same constant c. Putting these together, and setting
ηi = εi + δi, we get
ηi+1 ≤ 1
γ10n
ηi,
and so for all i, we get
ηi ≤ 1
γ10n2
η1.
Note that η1 = ε1 + δ1 = ε1. So by choosing ε1 = γ
10n2ε we get that ηi ≤ ε, and then the
solution computed is a 10ε-fixed point. The running time for the binary search algorithm is
poly(n, log(1/ε1)) = poly(n, log(1/γε)).
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